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The issue of civilian complaint review boards for
incidents involving citizen grievances against the
police has continued unresolved for over a decade.
While most of the acrimonious debate has been car-
ried on at the municipal level, Presidential commis-
sions, the FBI, and many national organizations
have contributed arguments and recommendations
at one time or another.' Nevertheless, the debate
has had to thrive mainly on ideology, rhetoric, and
opinion, for few cities haVe experimented with
civilian review boards, making data difficult to
obtain.
There is one city, however, that did have an
operating civilian review board for a sufficient
length of time to permit an analysis of its activities.
For about ten years (1958-1969), the Mayors of
Philadelphia appointed a group of prominent citi-
zens to the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board
(PAB) that had a mandate to accept citizen com-
plaints about alleged police misconduct.2 At the
same time, the Philadelphia Police Department's
Police Board of Inquiry (PBI) continued to hear
cases that involved citizen complaints, although
the bulk of its activity centered on internally gen-
erated disciplinary cases. Data on both these
' See, for example, THE NATIONAL ADVISORY Coy-
mrSSioN ON Civm DisoRDERs (The Kerner Commis-
sion), 1968; The President's Commission on Law En-
forcement and Administration of Justice, TAsK FORCE
REPORT: THE PoLIcE, 1967; Police Review Boards, Pre-
pared by National F.O.P. Committee on Human
Rights and Law Enforcement, Cincinnati; Open letter
by J. Edgar Hoover, FBI LAw ENFORcEmENT Bun-
IzTmn, January, 1965.
' A rather extensive report of the Philadelphia Police
Advisory Board prepared by the author appears in the
Por.cE m mn CoimaNrnt: THE DxAmcs oF THEz
RELATiONsHm IN A CHMGING SociETY by JoSEPH D.
LomAN AND GORDON E. MISNER, 1966, pp. 205-84;
also published as Fin.n SuRvEy IV. Volume 2, by the
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the
Administration of Justice, 1966. A more condensed
version is found in James R. Hudson, "The Civilian
Review Board Issue as Illuminated by the Philadelphia
Experience," 6 CUmIOLOGICA, 16-29 (1968).
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agencies have been obtained, permitting compari-
son of the organization and functions of the two.
This is especially pertinent because some critics
of civilian review have argued that such agencies
are redundant, performing functions that the police
organization already effectively handles.' The data
presented here suggest that, in Philadelphia at
least, the civilian review board was able to provide
services that the internal review board of the police
department did not. [Some of these functions may
be performed elsewhere in city government or else-
where within the police department, but that is not
at issue here. The purpose of this article is to com-
pare two organizations that had as a major activity
the handling of complaints against policemen
brought by citizens.]
The structure of these two agencies will be
examined, beginning with the mandate each re-
ceived. Data on civilian complaints will indicate
the kind of complaints received and the methods
of resolving them. The analysis shows that differ-
ences in mandate, staffing, organizational environ-
ment, and ideological commitment produced two
rather distinct types of procedures that ostensibly
dealt with the same problem. The comparison
raises some important questions about the handling
of citizen complaints and the consequences these
complaints have for the police department and the
community.
MANDATES AND PROCEDURES
Most cases that come to the Police Board of
Inquiry originate on the precinct level, where a
superior officer determines that a violation of the
Disciplinary Code may have occurred. The alleged
violation can come to his attention through a com-
plaint by a citizen or a fellow officer, by observation
or inspection. An investigation is then conducted
3 See in the matter of Harrington, et al., v. City of
Philadelphia, Court of Common Pleas, JuneTerm, 1965.
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and a report is forwarded through channels until it
reaches the police commissioner's desk. Although
the report passes through a number of command
levels after leaving the precinct, these officers can
not adjudicate the case; only the commissioner can
make a decision. Based upon this report, the com-
missioner takes direct disciplinary action or he
refers the case to the PBI for hearing. Most dis-
ciplinary cases, in fact, do come to the attention of
the PBI. It has two distinct functions-one admin-
istrative and the other judicial.
PBI hearings are held before a panel of officers
whom the administrative staff selects from outside
the accused policeman's district. These panels
usually include a captain, a lieutenant, and a pa-
trolman who sit for a number of cases. The officer
against whom the complaint has been made may
request that one member of the panel be of his own
rank. It is the responsibility of the permanent staff
of the PBI to set a time for the hearing, inform the
concerned parties, and bring together all relevant
information and files, including the policeman's
complete departmental dossier.
Hearings are open to the public, and evening
hearings have been instituted to accommodate
civilian witnesses who might otherwise have to miss
work in order to appear. The accused policeman
has the right to counsel, and he is most often repre-
sented by a lawyer provided by the Fraternal Order
of Police, a benevolent association of police officers.
The charges upon which a policeman can be
brought before the PBI are carefully detailed in the
Duty Manual of the Police Department which
forms the Disciplinary Code of the department.
There are five broad categories of offense: Conduct
Unbecoming an Officer, Intoxication, Insubordina-
tion, Neglect of Duty, and Disobedience of Orders.
Within each of these articles are a number of sec-
tions that specify various infractions. Each carries
a recommended disciplinary action. For example,
under Disobedience of Orders there is the specific
infraction: "Soliciting money or any valuable thing
without proper authorization." The first offense
carries a recommended five-to-ten-day suspension
without pay. In addition, each charge carries a
reckoning period for repeated offenses,'essentially a
statute of limitation. When the PBI panel finds
against an officer, it recommends to the commis-
sioner a penalty based upon the offense, the officer's
previous record, and other mitigating circum-
stances that might guide a disciplinary decision.
The commissioner then makes a determination,
which is duly transmitted to the officer and re-
corded in his dossier.
The Philadelphia Police Advisory Board, origi-
nally the Philadelphia Police Review Board, was
established in 1958 by Mayor J. Richardson Dil-
worth, and was "charged with the responsibility of
considering citizens' complaints against police
where the charge involved brutality, false arrest,
discrimination based upon race, religion, or na-
tional origin, or other wrongful conduct of police
personnel towards citizens." 4 It came into exist-
ence after hearings before the City Council where,
among other police issues, the internal review pro-
cedures came under sharp attack. The case against
that system was summarized in an article by
Spencer Coxe, Executive Director of the Greater
Philadelphia Branch of the ACLU, who wrote:
"When the Commissioner's office ordered an inves-
tigation, complainants found that the matter was
likely to peter out; they were usually not notified of
any conclusion unless they pressed for a report,
when they were told that the investigation showed
that the complaint was without justification." 5
Philadelphians filed their complaints directly
with the PAB. Initially, the only staff were the
volunteer panel of prominent citizens. In 1960 an
executive secretary was appointed on a part-time
basis and in 1963 on a full-time basis. The executive
secretary interviewed each complainant personally,
reviewed with him the substance of the complaint,
and discussed the kind of action the complainant
desired. For the PAB records, complaints were
classified as: brutality, illegal search and seizure,
harassment, and other.
Over time, the PAB worked out different strate-
gies for dealing with citizen complaints. Two of
these were conciliatory or mediating procedures. In
some cases, the citizen merely wanted an explana-
tion of police behavior-was the police action legal
or not? did the police have jurisdiction? and so on.
In such cases an explanation of the police actions
often resolved the complaint. In other cases, the
executive secretary arranged for a conference be-
tween the complainant and the accused officer or
another member of the police department. Again,
whenever this informal arrangement resolved the
dispute to the satisfaction of the citizen, his case
was dosed without a formal hearing.
4 The First Annual Report of the Police Advisory Board
of the City of Philadelphia, (1959), p. 1.
5 Spencer Coxe, Police Advisory Board, 35 CoNmEcr-
CUT BAR JoouRAL, 139 (1961).
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The third type of settlement involved a public
hearing before the appointed board of the PAB.
Prior to a hearing, the PAB requested from the
police department an investigation of the incident,
which was essentially a statement from the police
officer, along with copies of pertinent official docu-
ments and sometimes statements of witnesses. The
complainant's statement to the PAB served as his
written account of the incident. For the greater
part of the PAB's history, the Community Rela-
tions Office of the police department carried out
these investigations. Both the citizen and the officer
were permitted counsel at hearings. Usually,
citizens did not have legal representation and
policemen were represented by the Fraternal Order
of Police. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
board would meet privately and make a determina-
tion. There were no standardized penalties for any
offenses, nor was there an attempt to institute a
reckoning period.
If the PAB found the officer at fault, it would
send a recommendation for disciplinary action to
the office of the Managing Director of the City of
Philadelphia, who in turn passed it along to the
police commissioner. The intermediate step, send-
ing the recommendation to the Managing Direc-
tor's office, reflected the status of the PAB as an
advisory body to the Mayor. The PAB's recom-
mendation was in no way binding on the police
commissioner. As a matter of fact, however, the
PAB's recommendations were almost always ac-
cepted and implemented by the commissioner.
Since the PBI is an administrative adjunct to
the commissioner, his orientation affected its opera-
tions directly. The commissioner's authority to
send cases to the PBI and act upon its recommen-
dations give him a good deal of administrative
power over the PBI. All disciplinary cases cross the
commissioner's desk before going to the PEI. While
the writer has no data on the kinds of cases that did
not reach the PBI, the fact remains that the com-
missioners in Philadelphia could make such deci-
sions and these, in turn, would influence the role
played by the PBI. By the same token, the com-
missioners could either accept or reject the recom-
mendations from the PBI hearing panels. Again
without data it is difficult to document the conse-
quences of this discretionary power. Nonetheless, it
would seem apparent that the commissioner's ac-
tions on cases would become part of the orientation
of the PBI staff.
Of course, the commissioner could also accept or
reject PAB recommendations. But the PAB was
more autonomous in its operations. Even though it
was administratively responsible to the Mayors of
Philadelphia, it did not have the same kind of
organizational relations with the Mayor's office as
the PBI did with the commissioner's. The citizen
brought the case directly to the PAB and there was
no intermediate screening. Under these conditions
the PAB received a wider range of cases than those
processed by the PBI, which resulted in developing
the strategies of settlement that have already been
mentioned.
TEE PRoB3EATIC STATUS OP CI7z Comrzrunzs
Although both the PAB and the PBI received
complaints from civilians, the problem these com-
plaints posed is fundamentally different for the two
organizations. One difference is the constituency
each serves and the legitimation their constitu-
encies give to the agencies. The constituency for the
PAB is the citizen-complainant on one level and
the wider community on a more general level. The
PBI, by contrast, is concerned with the officer-
offender most immediately and the general disci-
pline of the department more abstractly.
The PAB was primarily concerned with the citi-
zen who believed he had been abused and with
what that meant to the community at large as well
as to the individual citizen. This orientation stems,
in part, from the underlying assumption that unre-
solved police-citizen conflicts increase community
tensions. The day-to-day objective was less to
document police misconduct or recommend disci-
plinary action than to reach a satisfactory accord
between the parties involved. The PAB's interest
was more in the citizen and his allegation than in
the policeman's action. This orientation toward the
citizen is further underscored in the PAB's use of
simple complaint categories adopted from the
language citizens employed during the early years
of its existence.
The Police Board of Inquiry is directed inward
toward the police organization, not outward toward
the community. The analogy between police de-
partments and military organizations is often
made. As with the military, police departments
often regard certain violations as much more
serious than similar incidents would be in civilian
life, for example, disregard for dress regulations or
personal grooming. At the core of these regulations
and adherence to them is the issue of discipline.
Even in those cases with civilian complainants, the
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main issue is not police-community relations, but
discipline. The charges against the policeman that
the PBI can hear are listed in the Duty Manual of
the Philadelphia Police Department under its
Disciplinary Code. They are stated in formal lan-
guage and reflect a concern with breaches in techni-
cal competence.6 Violations in the code indicate a
failure on the part of the policeman to carry out his
duties in the prescribed manner.
The difference in orientation between the PAB
and the PBI is further reflected in the criteria for
accepting or rejecting complaints. The PBI's em-
phasis on discipline focuses on the policeman's al-
leged violation of the Disciplinary Code. The pre-
cinct officer's decision to accept and process an
allegation is dependent upon his being reasonably
sure that a violation has taken place. No doubt
there are organizational pressures within the de-
partment not to forward any complaint where a
violation cannot be established. By contrast, the
PAB was under no such organizational constraint;
it was willing to accept and hear almost any citizen
complaint. Regardless of the investigation report
received from the police department, the PAB
would pursue the case and, if the complainant
wished, would hold a public hearing. The PAB was
concerned with giving the citizen the opportunity
to file a complaint and to engage in the process of
gaining redress. The process itself was regarded as
important because it involved the citizen.
This difference in intake philosophy is reflected
in Table 1. The probability of a policeman being
disciplined was far greater if the PBI held a hearing
than if the PAB did. The PBI recommended sus-
pensions, that is, days off without pay, in over half
of all cases it heard, about three times as often as
the PAB. Recommendations for dismissal were also
much more frequent for the PBI (14 per cent) as
compared to the PAB (1 per cent). Unlike the PBI,
the PAB used other methods of settling a case
after a hearing, such as requesting that the com-
plainant's arrest record be expunged or that a letter
of apology be sent to the citizen either from the
policemen involved in the incident or from officers
in the Community Relations Office. The PAB made
no recommendation either against the officer or for
the citizen in two-fifths of all-the cases it heard. The
PBI found 28 per cent of the policemen not guilty
in its hearings involving civilians.
While these data are far from conclusive, it ap-
The concept "breach in technical competence" was
suggested by Harvey Farberman.
Table 1








Suspensions 14% 52% 76%
Dismissals 1 14 5
Reprimands 16 6 9
Other Negative Action 6 *2 *




Not Guilty * 28 10
No Recommendation 40 * *
Not Ascertained 3 - -
Totals
%100 100 100
N 145 458 2214
1 Includes only principal complainants to eliminate
double counting on recommendations.
2 No comparable category.
pears that if a citizen's complaint enters into police
channels, there is a very high likelihood that some
disciplinary action will be taken against the police
officer. What is not known is how many times
citizens tried to complain or did complain, but their
cases were not forwarded from the precinct so that
the PBI got them. In addition, it is not known for
what allegations the police officer was found at
fault. About 65 per cent of all cases involved multi-
ple allegations and it could not be determined
which allegation produced what disciplinary action.
On the other hand, the few negative recommenda-
tions by the PAB do not necessarily mean that it
was less effective in dealing with citizen complaints.
The PAB, it should be recalled, was more inter-
ested in giving the citizen an opportunity to pursue
an alleged grievance than it was in sanctioning
police officers.
The PAB's orientation to the problem of com-
munity tensions and its role as an advisory board
to the Mayor produced another difference between
the two agencies. While both processed a number
of cases, the PAB was more conscious that the cases
themselves represented only a part of the whole
picture of police-community relations. It acted on
[Vol. 63
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the premise that these cases were a selection from a
larger but unknown number of incidents. In annual
reports the board not only listed the number of
cases, how they were settled, and the allegations in-
volved, but used these data as the basis for making
more general recommendations to the Mayor. For
example, a number of incidents involving the use of
handcuffs came to the attention of the PAB, and its
report made specific recommendations that the
policy goverpig handcuffs be reviewed.7 This kind
of advice was not a part of the PBI's mission. The
PAB was interested in changing police practices
and policies that contributed to community ten-
sions; the PBI is not involved in policy formation.
IMPACT ON CITIzEN ComiLAwANs, PoLICEMEN,
AND TFH CO n UNM
Because the PAB developed alternative strate-
gies for settling complaints and the decision of
which strategy rested, in part, with the citizen, the
consequences for the policeman involved were
much less predictable than if charges against him
were heard by the PBL If the citizen decided that
an apology or an explanation satisfied his grievance,
the case could be settled without a hearing and
therefore without the possibility of an adverse
recommendation from the PAB. On the other hand,
if the citizen did push for a hearing, another police-
man could face disciplinary action for an offense
similar to the first. The issue, then, is whether the
function of civilian review is to satisfy a civilian
with a complaint or to assist the police department
in monitoring the behavior of its men. If it were the
latter, then the focus of civilian review would be on
whether or not the policeman was at fault. In
Philadelphia, because of the emphasis on the re-
duction of community tensions, the citizen's satis-
faction was the central concern. In practice, the
PAB would not pursue a case in which the citizen
lost interest, withdrew the complaint, or accepted a
settlement without a hearing.
The PBI is not as dependent upon the citizen as
the PAB. If a citizen brings a complaint and subse-
quent investigation suggests that the policeman
has violated some article of the Disciplinary Code,
the PBI may no longer need the citizen nor does it
care what action the citizen desires because it be-
comes a matter of internal discipline. For example,
a citizen could accuse a policeman of illegally
entering his home. If the investigation supports the
7 TlT Fourth Annual Report of the Police Advisory
Board of the City of Philadelphia, (1962), p. 4 .
Table 2
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST PoLicE OrricERs BASED UPON
CIVMM CoLARnMs SENT TO THE PBI
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer 51%
Intoxication 3
Insubordination 2
Neglect of Duty 29




1 This total reflects multiple allegations against the
458 officers involved.
allegation and additional violations of the Disci-
plinary Code are uncovered, the police department
acts independently from the citizen in pursuing the
case leading to disciplinary action on the part of the
commissioner or the PBI. Even if the citizen were
to withdraw his allegation against a policeman,
other evidence gathered in the investigation could
serve as a basis for a hearing8
As a matter of fact, complaints invblving citizen
witnesses or complainants form a minority of the
cases coming to the PBI. In a review of over 2700
cases from 1960 to 1968, not quite one out of five
(19%) was based upon a citizen complaint. Even in
those cases with civilian complainants, the main
issue is not police-community relations, but disci-
pline. Thus a citizen's complaint is translated into
this perspective. For example, a citizen complaint
of brutality or excessive use of force becomes in
official language "Repeated violations of depart-
ment rules and regulations, or any other course of
conduct indicating that a member has little or no
regard for his responsibility as a member of the
Police Department." It is the official departmental
position about the officer's act that is at the core of
departmental discipline, not the citizen's inter-
pretation of the act.
It should also be noted that the sheer number of
hearings reflects a difference between the two
agencies. During its history the PAB received and
processed about 677 cases. Some of these had
multiple complainants, so that about 1000 indi-
viduals made use of the PAB, although only a small
8 In the Police Board of Inquiry Annual Report 1970
this outcome was stated as follows: "There have been
occasions when even though the civilian complainant
failed to appear [for a hearing], disciplinary action was
taken based on violations of departmental regulations."
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proportion of the incidents reached a hearing
(about 21 per cent). This indicates the alternative
routes open to the PAB for settling citizen com-
plaints. Such options simply are not available to
the PBI.
The comparison within the PBI between com-
plaints initiated by civilians and those by non-
civilians is also of interest. Complaints originating
in the police department are far more likely to re-
sult in disciplinary recommendations than those
that come from outside the department. About
three times as many hearings are settled with a
"not guilty" for cases with a citizen complainant
than for cases coming from members of the depart-
ment itself. It would be useful in future research to
investigate the allegations made by civilians to see
what kinds of cases result in "not guilty" recom-
mendations. In particular, it would be important if
these cases come from the more controversial alle-
gations such as brutality.
While those data are not available for this study,
there are data on the allegations each agency re-
ceived that suggest some of the organizational and
functional differences between them. In Table 2 the
total number of allegations involved in the 458
hearings held by the PBI with civilian complaints
is listed. Fifty-one per cent of all allegations fell
within the category of Conduct Unbecoming an
Officer (CUAO). Within that category no single
charge accounts for more than 12 per cent and this
is the title category itself. Within CUAO the charge
of "Using rude or insulting language or conduct
offensive to the public" was made in 9 per cent of
the cases, followed by the charge of "Knowingly
and willfully making a false entry into any depart-
mental report or record" (7 per cent). The charge
under which brutality would be subsumed was next
with just under 5 per cent of all allegations. Under
Neglect of Duty, the two major charges were
"Failure to comply with any Commissioner's or-
ders, directives, regulations, etc., oral or written;
and those of superiors and supervisors" and
"Failure to take police action when necessary, at
any time, in or out of uniform, and/or failure to
make a written report of same to commanding
officer." The proportions were 9 and 7 per cent
respectively. All other charges never exceeded 4
per cent.
In Table 3 it can be seen that brutality, either
alone or in combination with some other allegation,
comprised 45 per cent of all complaints the PAB
received. Harassment was the next most frequent
Table 3
ALLEGATiONS AGAINST POLICE OrncERs o PPMCIPLE
C031PnLANANTS TO r PAB
Brutality Alone and in Combination with 45%
Other Allegations
Illegal Search and Seizure 15
Harassment 21
Other 9
Multiple (Not brutality) Allegations 10
% 100%1
N 868
1 Includes 181 cases for which no police investigation
was conducted.
allegation (21 per cent), followed by illegal search
and seizure (15 per cent).
Perhaps the most serious allegation a citizen can
bring against a policeman is brutality. Since the
police have been given the legitimate use of vio-
lence in our society, indiscretion in that respect is a
damaging charge-one to which the police are
rightly sensitive. Yet brutality, or its more euphe-
mistic label-excessive use of force-is very diffi-
cult to prove; indeed, no clear definition of brutal-
ity exists. The charge has been raised when the
police used racial or ethnic slurs against members
of minority groups as well as in cases where police-
men have beaten citizen or even shot at them.
As was noted earlier, the Disciplinary Code of
the Philadelphia Police Department does not in-
dude an allegation of brutality or excessive use of
force. The police, of course, are disturbed by this
term because of its emotional overtones. If the
allegation is made by a citizen, a more bureau-
cratically neutral charge is employed. The PAB
felt no necessity to neutralize the term because its
creation stemmed, in part, from the failure of
citizens to obtain redress in cases where brutality
had been charged. And since the PAB's allegation
categories were based upon the language citizens
used, its inclusion was only natural.
CONCLUSIONS
The data from Philadelphia strongly suggest that
something more than, a jurisdictional rearrange-
ment resulted when citizens were offered a mode of
redress other than police jurisdiction over all
citizen-initiated complaints. Differences in man-
date, staffing, organization environment, and
ideology resulted in two distinct types of review
[Vol. 63
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agencies. The conceptualization of the problem, the
ways in which altercations were settled, and the
other functions served were markedly different.
These distinctions can be summarized as follows:
The PBI is an internal, administrative-judicial
body close to the center of a paramilitary bureau-
cratic organization. Its primary task is to assist the
commissioner in formally maintaining discipline
within the department. As a consequence, the PBI
never receives some citizen complaints, those with
insufficient grounds for charges against a specific
officer, or those settled by other means at the pre-
cinct level or through the intervention of the Com-
munity Relations Office. When the PBI does re-
ceive a case based on a citizen's complaint, its
organizational focus remains fixed upon the officer
charged with violation of the Disciplinary Code. It
has no mandate or staff to pursue alternative reso-
lutions to a police-citizen dispute, even if a finding
against the policeman is not the main purpose of
the citizen who registered a complaint.
The PAB was an appointed board of citizens
whose mandate was broadly interpreted to include
advice to the Mayor on improving police-corn-
munity relations on the basis of citizen complaints
and, more narrowly, to assist the citizen in a resolu-
tion of this problem whenever the board, through
public hearings or other means, was satisfied that
the complaint had substance. The board or its
executive secretary reviewed every complaint in
detail, and the choice of a public hearing was avail-
able to any complainant, regardless of the evidence
available prior to the hearing. In many cases the
complaint amounted to a specific charge against a
police officer, and the board recommended disci-
plinary measures whenever it found such charges
warranted. But in many other cases the complaint
involved no charge against a particular officer, but
a desire for other measures of redress, restitution,
or changes in department or precinct practices.
The analysis presented here does not permit one
to include whether one or the other is the better
method of resolving police-citizen altercations, but
it does indicate some of the problems in developing
a satisfactory redress agency. It is hoped that this
investigation will throw some light on what con-
tinues to be a very sensitive problem in police-
community relations.
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